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Evidence History, the New Trace Evidence, and 
Rumblings in the Future of Proof 
 
 
Robert P. Mosteller* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is in two parts.  The first part is about developments in the rules of 
evidence and particularly about developments in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
which have had a major impact on evidence rules in many states.  This part turns 
out to be largely about the past because my sense is that the impact of changes in 
the formal rules of evidence, which were substantial, are largely historic.  In one 
area, however, significant future changes in the formal rules seem possible: those 
that may be made as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. 
Washington,1 which dramatically changed confrontation and may unleash hearsay 
reformulation.  
The second part deals with my sense that technological and scientific 
advances may have a dramatic impact in altering the way cases, particularly 
criminal cases, are proved and evaluated in the future.  For example, the 
development and proliferation of a new type of “trace evidence”—electronic “trace 
evidence”—is providing dispositive proof in a larger and larger group of cases.  As 
jurors come to understand such dispositive proof exists in many cases, they may 
come to expect it in all, potentially changing how proof in criminal cases is 
evaluated.  Of course, these possibilities—these rumblings in the future of proof—
are speculative.  However, there are reasons at least to suspect that, as a result of 
the accumulation of events brought on by scientific and technological 
developments, important changes both in the type of evidence offered and the way 
it is evaluated are beginning to occur that differ in kind from the past. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
*   Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University.  I would like to thank Professors Ken Broun, 
Daniel Capra, David Faigman, Roger Park, Elizabeth Gibson, and Andy Taslitz for their helpful ideas 
and suggestions; Justin Diamant for his assistance with the research; and the judges of the Ohio 
Judicial Conference, where this paper was first presented, for their comments. 
1   541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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II. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE—PRIMARILY AN EXAMINATION  
OF THE PAST 
 
A. The Major Event of Developing a National Model for Evidence Rules 
 
Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which were enacted in 1975, efforts at 
evidence rulemaking had been largely unsuccessful.2  The first major effort was by 
the Commonwealth Fund, whose report was published in 1927.3  It was reformist, 
claimed to be empirically based, and was designed to enhance the control of trial 
judges and curtail the power of lawyers in what it described as a scientific search 
for the truth.  The report had little effect, except that it influenced the development 
of the modern business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
In 1939, the American Law Institute began its project to create a Model Code 
of Evidence.  Professor Edmund Morgan was its Reporter.  This proposal, which 
was published in 1942,4 went nowhere, much like the Commonwealth Fund Report 
before it.  One explanation was that it put too much discretion in the hands of trial 
judges, but overall the explanation for its lack of impact was the poor salesmanship 
of Professor Morgan.  He tended to challenge and frighten the bar and bench, 
presenting the evidence proposal as just a part of a larger reform effort.5  Professor 
Eileen Scallen suggests that Morgan failed to understand the relatively 
conservative nature of lawyers when it comes to trial procedures.6 
The Model Code did become the basis of the effort by the Commissioners of 
National Conference on Uniform State Laws to draft Uniform State Laws on 
Evidence.  Significantly, however, the Commissioners redirected the goal toward 
“acceptability and uniformity,” rather than reform.7  The first set of Uniform 
Evidence Rules was issued in 1953 with modest effect, being adopted only in 
Kansas, New Jersey, and Utah.8 
There seemed to be a catch-22 to efforts to create and enact new evidence 
rules.  If they made no real changes, the reaction was: Why adopt them? On the 
other hand, if they changed the law, some group of lawyers who had an interest 
harmed by the proposal rose up in opposition.  Uniformity of rules of evidence 
                                                                                                                            
2   See generally 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 5005–5006 (1977) (detailing evidentiary rules developments in the 
twentieth century and through the drafting of the federal rules); Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The 
Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking,” 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 847–56 (2002) (sketching the history of 
evidence reform efforts). 
3   EDMUND M. MORGAN ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM 
(1927). 
4   21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5005, at 84–86. 
5   Scallen, supra note 2, at 849. 
6   Id. at 851. 
7   21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5005, at 90. 
8   Scallen, supra note 2, at 851. 
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across the states was not highly valued by most lawyers.  Perhaps professors at 
national law schools and large law firms with multi-state practices cared, but most 
lawyers did not.  So the call to national uniformity by itself had little appeal. 
The motivating force to enact rules of evidence would in the end come from 
the federal courts.  In 1963, the Judicial Conference of the federal courts 
recommended the creation of Federal Rules of Evidence.  Several years later, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren appointed the Advisory Committee, with Professor Edward 
Cleary as its Reporter.  The Advisory Committee was carefully balanced with 
representatives from a large number of different types of practices; it had special 
emphasis on trial lawyers and judges; and it was a generally conservative group.  
The preliminary draft was created over the course of the next four years with 
the bulk of the work performed by Professor Edward Cleary.  It was made public 
in 1969.  When the Supreme Court received the revised rules from the Judicial 
Conference a year later, rather than sending them directly to Congress under the 
Rules Enabling Act, it sent them back to the Judicial Conference to be published 
for comment.  This move drew the attention of Congress, produced objections 
from a group of Senators, and brought about the incorporation of a number of 
changes proposed by the Justice Department.  The proposed rules were finally 
transmitted to Congress in 1972. 
The proposed rules on privilege drew a particularly negative reaction from 
Congress.  With the Watergate scandal unfolding, these rules expanded 
governmental privileges, which understandably was not popular at the time.  
Additional issues were also raised, such as what appeared to be excessive influence 
by a Justice Department hierarchy that was viewed with suspicion.  The upshot 
was that in 1973, Congress passed a law that the rules of evidence could not take 
effect until expressly approved by Congress.9 
In this process, the proposed privilege rules were dropped in favor of Rule 
501, which left the rules of privilege to legislation or common law development.  
Basically, the judgment of the supporters of the rules was that either there could be 
rules of evidence that did not contain privilege rules, or no rules at all.  Some of 
the concern was that the federal rules had the substantive effect of altering state 
privilege law in diversity cases.  Rule 501 also accommodated that concern by 
deferring generally to state privileges in such cases. 
In January 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.10  To date, 
forty-two states have adopted rules of evidence based generally on the federal rules  
and the Uniform Rules,11 which have largely tracked the then-existing federal 
model since the initial federal draft in 1969.12 
                                                                                                                            
9   Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973). 
10  Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
11  6 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, TABLE OF STATE AND MILITARY ADAPTATIONS (2d ed. 
2005). 
12  Scallen, supra note 2, at 851−52 (noting that while initially following the federal model 
rather closely, the uniform rules have begun to diverge somewhat more in recent years from the 
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What seems to have been persuasive was that, while most lawyers do not have 
multi-state practices and so care little about cross-state uniformity, requiring 
knowledge of two sets of rules within the same state seemed too much.  Perhaps 
more important was that the federal rules successfully codified in a usable form 
largely familiar doctrines and procedures developed under the common law.  The 
rules seemed helpful and did not prove that threatening or difficult to learn and 
use.  As more states adopted them, they also developed momentum as the largely 
national standard. 
While the federal rules may have been largely a statement of the progressive 
common law at the time, enacting a set of rules had one significant impact that I 
see as conservative in nature: with codified rules enacted by the legislature, rather 
than judge-made rules of common law origin, the concept of “plain meaning” 
analysis applies.  As to an integrated statute, plain meaning analysis tells us that its 
language is to be followed without examination of legislative history or policy 
unless the result is absurd or inconsistent with other provisions of the same 
statute.13 
Under this analysis, the Supreme Court ruled in Huddleston v. United States14 
that “other crimes evidence” under Rule 404(b) need only be proved by sufficient 
evidence such that the jury could find the fact, not a determination of clear and 
convincing evidence by the trial judge, which most federal circuits and many states 
had required prior to the enactment of codified rules.15  The effect of plain meaning 
analysis has been to reduce the impact of policy on judicial interpretation of the 
rules of evidence and to make them somewhat more wooden and fixed in 
application.  I see a clear difference when reading federal privilege cases in the 
flexibility of application permitted if the apparent operation of the “rule” is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege.  Since there are no codified federal 
privilege rules and thus plain meaning analysis does not apply, the federal trial and 
appellate courts are much freer to use policy to correct what they perceive would 
otherwise be inappropriate outcomes.  
                                                                                                                            
federal rules, such as by the uniform rules omitting Federal Rules 413−415). 
13  See generally Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After 
Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 142 F.R.D. 519 (1992); 
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 
TEX. L. REV. 745 (1990). 
Others have noted another conservative feature of codification.  After codification, the common 
law rulemaking powers of judges are restricted in a system where the creation of “rules” is 
principally not the responsibility of judges.  See Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence: Tending to the Past and Pretending for the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 819 
(2002) (arguing that this shift has negatively changed the dynamic of how evidentiary rules develop). 
14  485 U.S. 681 (1988).  
15  See, e.g., United States v. Weber, 818 F.2d 14, 14 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 1987).  See generally United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d. 898 
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (discussing in the majority the different approach taken after passage of 
Federal Rules of Evidence and in the dissent the prior pattern in other circuits). 
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Since the federal rules were adopted, the rules have remained relatively stable 
and further systemic reform has not occurred, although cumulatively there have 
been a substantial number of amendments over the years.  Several rules have been 
added.  In 1978, Congress adopted Rule 412, the rape shield law, which somewhat 
surprisingly was not part of the original rules but developed in concept in the 
states.  In 1995, over the objection of the Judicial Conference and the Evidence 
Advisory Committee, Congress also enacted Rules 413–415, which admit the 
defendant’s propensity evidence shown through past criminal sexual acts.  Rule 
804(b)(6), which admits hearsay evidence through “forfeiture by wrongdoing,” 
was added in 1997. 
Changes of note have been made in Rules 701, 702, and 703 (codifying 
Daubert16 principles and other restrictions on expert testimony); Rule 404 (minor 
modifications of proof of the character of the accused and victim in criminal 
cases); Rule 407 (minor modifications of restriction on use of subsequent remedial 
measures and application to product liability cases); Rule 410 (restricting exclusion 
of failed criminal plea negotiations to those involving negotiations with 
government attorneys, etc.);17 Rule 609 (revising balancing tests for impeachment 
with criminal convictions);18 Rule 704 (restricting opinion on ultimate issue going 
to mental state in criminal cases);19 Rule 801(d)(2) (modifying proof of vicarious 
admissions);20 Rules 803(6), 902(11), 902(12) (admissibility of business records 
by certification); and Rule 807 (consolidation of the catchall exceptions into one 
rule and renumbering it).21 
Although some notable individual additions have been made, the rules in their 
basic structure and substance are largely unchanged since their enactment.  
Certainly, there has been nothing that would be termed a systemic revision or 
substantial law reform in the intervening years. 
                                                                                                                            
16  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
17  The rule was amended in 1980 to require that covered plea negotiations be held with an 
attorney for the prosecuting authority, which was intended to rectify an interpretation of the earlier 
language that arguably excluded interrogations by investigating officers that touched on a potential 
guilty plea.  See Fed. R. Evid. 410 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment. 
18  This change was made by Congress largely to “correct” the result reached by the Supreme 
Court in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989). 
19  This change was enacted by Congress in the aftermath of the unpopular jury decision to 
find John Hinkley not guilty by reason of insanity for his assassination attempted on President 
Ronald Reagan.  See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 232 (1984), as repreinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3414 (giving legislative history). 
20  These modifications were made to respond to and to codify the rulings of the Supreme 
Court in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
21  In addition, proposed changes from the Advisory Committee in Rule 408 to prohibit 
impeachment use and to clarify the rule’s application in criminal cases have reached the Supreme 
Court and in Rule 609 to clarify how courts are to determine when criminal convictions of a witness 
that may involve deceit are to be so considered, which renders them automatically admissible to 
impeach.  These changes and several other minor changes are likely to become effective in December 
2006. 
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 One reason for the absence of truly major changes is that the Supreme Court 
disbanded the Evidence Advisory Committee after enactment of the rules.  Unlike 
the rules of civil and criminal procedure, where advisory committees have 
continued in existence throughout the period, the Supreme Court apparently 
thought writing the rules of evidence had been completed.  Even after being 
reconstituted in 1992, the Evidence Advisory Committee has not been about law 
reform or an activist agenda.  One reason is that then Chief Justice Rehnquist gave 
directions to the chairs of all the advisory committees that he wanted only 
revisions necessary to rectify clear problems, not law reform.  Committee members 
and critics of their relative inaction agree they have taken a view that “if it ain’t 
broke don’t fix it.”22 Some committee members are also somewhat fearful that if 
they propose major changes they may provoke Congress to recommend politically 
inspired alternatives.  
At its January 2002 meeting, the program of the Evidence Section of the 
Association of American Law Schools focused on the politics of evidence 
rulemaking.  The clear message from the program’s panel, which included some 
past and present participants on the Advisory Committee, was that there are no 
plans to change this general picture of incremental and modest change. 
The immediate plans for the Advisory Committee concern issues that are 
substantial, but they do not envision expansive treatment of those issues.  One item 
is a project to suggest possible codification of rules of privilege.  Congress was 
fervently opposed to codification of privilege rules in 1975, and I doubt the picture 
has changed.  In any case, the effort is not seen as groundbreaking, but more on the 
order of writing into rule form for the federal courts the current common law 
understanding of the basic privileges and resolving some of the conflicts that have 
developed in the federal courts’ treatment of them.23  These proposals, if adopted 
some years from now, should have little effect on the states, which have often 
established evidentiary privileges rules either as part of their evidence rules or by 
separate legislation. 
A second proposed project is to deal with technological developments in the 
presentation of evidence.  As I will discuss in the second part of this paper, the 
impact of science and technology on the presentation of evidence is becoming 
enormous, with the promise of even greater impact in the future.  However, the 
changes envisioned by the Advisory Committee for the formal evidence rules are 
very modest.  The immediate changes will likely only involve modifications of 
terminology to incorporate the term “electronically stored information” into the 
rules at appropriate places. 
The third type of change, which in a broader form is the subject of my next 
topic, is to conform the hearsay rules to the new confrontation doctrine once the 
                                                                                                                            
22  See Rice, supra note 13, at 820−26 (criticizing what Professor Rice sees as inappropriate 
inaction rather than modernizing the rules and preparing them for the future). 
23  See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (2002). 
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full implications of Crawford v. Washington are known.24  As discussed below, 
Crawford may provoke very significant hearsay reformulations, but I doubt they 
will first occur in the federal courts or the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
What are the general prospects for the future impact of changes in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence?  My view is that unlike what happened in 1975, there is little 
reason to believe that the federal drafters and the federal rules will lead the march 
in future modifications.  This situation could, however, change if Chief Justice 
were to direct a more activist role for the Advisory Committee.25  I suspect such a 
change in direction is unlikely, but not unthinkable with respect to hearsay 
reformulation. 
An additional reason that the federal sector is not likely to be the leader in 
systemic changes is that Congress has in the past insisted that it be directly 
involved in major changes in evidence rules rather than leaving them to the Rules 
Enabling Act procedure.  Given the partisan split within Congress, it is unlikely 
that a majority can be brought together on a broad scale set of changes.  Too often, 
specific rules excite interest groups, but broad scale reform has no fervent political 
following .26 
 
B. The Present and the Near-Term Future: The Opportunity that Crawford v. 
Washington May Provide for Possible Fundamental Hearsay Rule Reformulation 
 
I have written extensively about Crawford v. Washington previously,27 and I 
will not repeat that detail here.  My point is that the “old system” of Ohio v. 
Roberts28 that linked the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause very, very 
                                                                                                                            
24  The three elements of the agenda for the Advisory Committee described above are taken 
from a conversation with Professor Daniel Capra, Reporter for the Advisory Committee, summarized 
from public discussions of the Committee. 
25  The confirmation hearings of Justice Roberts provide no basis to conclude he will take a 
position different from Rehnquist, and if he does deviate, one would not expect a change in course in 
the early years of his tenure as Chief Justice. 
26  The discussion at the 2002 Evidence Section meeting indicated that changes in specific 
evidence rules may draw substantial interest because they clearly help or hurt certain parties.  On the 
other side, no politically connected constituency supports disinterested evidence reform.  Thus, 
particular evidence rules may gain majority support and be enacted, but it is unlikely that anything so 
sweeping as the Federal Rules of Evidence would today command majority support in Congress.  See 
Scallen, supra note 2, at 864–67 (analyzing the comments of several panel members about the narrow 
interest of political factions in specific evidence rules that might support self-interested changes, in 
contrast to little sustained interest in more general and neutral law reform). 
27  See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring 
Confrontation, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring 
Confrontation]; see also Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic Definition—The 
Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 (Summer 2005); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford’s 
Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 411 (2005). 
28  484 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
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closely may be completely discarded in Crawford’s wake, thereby creating 
enormous potential for hearsay reformulation. 
Under the Roberts regime, a Confrontation Clause challenge was satisfied if 
the hearsay fell within a “firmly rooted” exception, such as an excited utterance.    
An exception was “firmly rooted” if it had been in existence for a lengthy period of 
time and was widely accepted in American jurisdictions.  Thus, if the statement fit 
within one of these “firmly rooted” exceptions, the constitutional issue was 
resolved.  Moreover, for that firmly rooted exception and many others, the 
unavailability of the declarant was not required.  Meeting the hearsay rule meant 
the evidence was admissible both as a matter of evidence law and constitutional 
law. 
The very useful role that these well-established hearsay exceptions had in 
resolving the constitutional issue under Roberts meant that no one was about to 
recommend radical hearsay rule revision.  Radically revised rules would obviously 
not be considered “firmly rooted.” Also, unlike many European countries, we do 
not have one set of evidence rules for civil cases and another for criminal cases, 
notwithstanding that some of our rules apply in specific ways to the criminal 
defendant or in criminal cases.  We are committed to one set of rules that generally 
apply to all litigation, and as a result, even though the Confrontation Clause does 
not apply in civil cases, hearsay reform was not suggested even there.  Thus, the 
linkage between the rules of evidence and confrontation inhibited major changes in 
hearsay rules. 
Crawford potentially changes that picture and could make fundamental 
hearsay reform possible.  Crawford harshly criticized the Roberts test that resolved 
confrontation challenges by measuring the trustworthiness or reliability of the 
statement in accordance with hearsay theory.29  Crawford said that the purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause was to prevent inquisitorial procedures and that the way 
to accomplish that goal is to exclude out-of-court statements that are “testimonial.” 
Satisfying that conception of the Confrontation Clause, by contrast to Roberts, has  
nothing directly to do with the hearsay rules, and is effectively disconnected from 
hearsay doctrine. 
The only uncertainty remaining is whether the Supreme Court in a future 
decision will completely destroy the “Old System” of Roberts or leave it as a 
backstop.30  Crawford so ridiculed its basic rationale31 that the Court may have 
                                                                                                                            
29  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–68. 
30  Id. at 68 (stating that “[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent 
with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does 
Roberts and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny 
altogether”). 
In the fall of 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two confrontation cases, Davis v. 
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 547 (2005), and Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct. 552 (2005).  While these two 
cases should give some needed definition to the testimonial concept, neither case appears to present 
the issue of the future of Roberts. 
31  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–68. 
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difficulty leaving Roberts operative at all.  Almost certainly Justice Scalia, who 
wrote the Crawford opinion, would entirely overrule Roberts, but other justices 
may feel differently. 
If we assume an evidence world in which Roberts has been obliterated and 
where retaining the traditional (firmly rooted) hearsay exceptions has no advantage 
in deciding criminal cases,32 massive reformulation of the hearsay rules would be 
possible.  Interestingly, the initial proposal of the hearsay rules made by the Rules 
Advisory Committee in 1969 and endorsed by the United States Supreme Court 
was not the set of specific exceptions we have today, totaling about thirty.  Instead, 
it was a general rule that looked much like the present residual exception that 
directed the trial court simply to evaluate the trustworthiness and necessity of the 
statement and to admit or exclude based on that ad hoc determination.33 
I do not know if that type of rule would be attractive to trial lawyers, who 
often favor predictability over flexibility.  My guess is that it would engender some 
real opposition by those with vested interests in the current system, particularly 
defense attorneys, who as a group generally favor rules that restrict the admission 
of evidence, and especially criminal defense attorneys, who tend to fear the 
exercise of judicial discretion against unloved criminals.  It would bring back the 
conflicts that were so prominent when the rules were first proposed—whether to 
give more discretion to trial judges or more power to lawyers and control to 
legislators, which also pits certainty, predictability, and complexity against 
flexibility and simplicity. 
My suspicion is that despite opposition some state(s) would take the plunge 
and experiment on a radically simplified hearsay rule with regard to exceptions.  It 
is not a secret that most hearsay is ultimately admitted, and thus there is some 
merit to the argument that the current complex system of exceptions imposes 
needless costs.  Also some empirical evidence supports the proposition that jurors 
discount the value of hearsay so that it may not in fact be very much over-valued in 
evidentiary effect.34  
If my predictions are roughly correct, a decade from now some states will be 
                                                                                                                            
32  See Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union: 
Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185 (2004) (arguing 
that Crawford has accomplished the separation of a union that Professor Reed argues was fatally 
flawed from the beginning). 
33  Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and 
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 & 377 (1969) (using similar elements for two rules, one where 
unavailability is not required and the other where it is).  What constitutes our specific exceptions 
were listed in the rules, but they were given as examples of the types of statements that would meet 
their requirements, id. at 345–50 & 377–78, not as exceptions.  The general structure was thus much 
like current Rule 901.  See Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring Confrontation, supra note 27, at 
520–21 (discussing possible dramatic impact of Crawford on the future of hearsay). 
34  See Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 683 (1992) (examining empirical evidence that jurors discount the value of hearsay 
evidence, which the authors argue should make receiving hearsay at least somewhat less 
problematic). 
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experimenting with fundamental hearsay rule reformulation.  Later, if a consensus 
seemed to be developing that the experiment had succeeded, the federal rules 
might adopt such a pattern. 
 
III. THE UNCERTAIN LONGER-TERM FUTURE: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND 
SCIENCE UPON THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AND THE PROOF OF CASES 
 
The most far-reaching concern of this essay is also its most uncertain.  That is 
the enormous impact that I believe technology and science will have in various 
ways on the presentation of evidence in the courtroom, the development of 
evidence in the outside world, and the appreciation and evaluation of evidence by 
juries.  This discussion is not directed at rules of evidence per se and certainly not 
at the federal rules.  It is about evidence broadly conceived and future trends, 
particularly in criminal cases. 
I intend my suggestions to be provocative and thereby to encourage readers to 
construct their own vision of how the future of proof may be affected by the types 
of changes that I examine.  In the end, I do not reach a clear conclusion about 
evidence law changes.  I suspect that the precise shape of predictions, like most 
efforts to predict the future and particularly those that are at all ambitious, may be 
a bit off target.  What I mainly seek to accomplish in this part is to bring together 
some developing trends and suggest a possible view of how in the future they may 
affect the way cases are proved. 
 
A. Technological Impact on the Presentation of Evidence in the Courtroom   
 
With increasing force, computers, digital evidence, and computer-generated 
exhibits are making their way into the courtroom.  Either through court-provided 
technology or using that of the parties, various new methods of displaying data 
electronically to juries and judges are becoming available.  In addition, technology 
provides opportunities for video conferencing and for presenting witnesses from 
off-site locations or for holding hearings with some of the parties at different 
locations. 
All of these changes present evidentiary issues and costs and benefits.  
Authentication, best evidence, and hearsay issues regarding such evidence are 
certainly real, but they do not seem to have caused great difficulty or to have been 
treated by the courts as qualitatively different than with more traditional forms of 
evidence.  Indeed, since much evidence that ultimately is presented on paper 
existed at some time as computer-stored data, there is often a commonality of 
issues between “traditional” and digital evidence. 
I do not mean to say that this is not an interesting or a complicated set of 
issues or that it does not call for legal changes.  For example, in 1998, Maryland 
added a provision to its Rules of Civil Procedure35 that drew attention for 
                                                                                                                            
35  MD. R.P. 2-504.3. 
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beginning to define and deal with computer-generated evidence.36  It requires 
notice of intent to introduce such evidence and establishes a procedure for 
litigating admissibility.  The rule represents a helpful step in managing 
admissibility decisions.37  
Those of us who began our careers decades ago when this type of technology 
was unknown or in its infancy, face challenges in being open to such new methods 
of presenting evidence.  However, an expanding set of materials has grown up to 
help lawyers utilize this technology and to a lesser degree assist judges in ruling on 
admissibility.38  Even without special aids, my instinct is that judges can rule on 
these matters effectively through the exercise of basic principles.  
Often, the most important issue for judges is how to let the parties prove their 
cases effectively using new technology without distorting the cases or unfairly 
favoring one side.  Resolving these challenges are matters of judgment and 
sensitive application for Rule 403.39  Other important questions concern whether 
the evidence in an electronic medium is introduced into evidence or is simply used 
as a method of displaying the underlying traditional evidence to the jury.  This 
distinction regarding formal admission is important to whether the evidence can be 
                                                                                                                            
36  See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 261–63 (2000). 
37  Presently pending before the Committee on Practices and Procedures (“Standing 
Committee”) of the Federal Judicial Conference are amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that deal with electronically stored information.  The amendments affect Civil Rules 11, 
26, 33, 34, 37 and 45. 
38  See, e.g., EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME: FORENSIC SCIENCE, 
COMPUTERS, AND THE INTERNET (2d ed. 2004); PIKE & FISHER, INC., DIGITAL DISCOVERY & E-
EVIDENCE: BEST PRACTICES AND EVOLVING LAW (2005); MICHELE C.S. LANGE & KRISTIN M. 
NIMSGER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY: WHAT EVERY LAWYER SHOULD KNOW (ABA 
2004); THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE, DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM: A 
GUIDE FOR PREPARING DIGITAL EVIDENCE FOR COURTROOM PRESENTATION (2003); PAUL R. RICE, 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE (ABA 2005); Galves, supra note 36; Fredric L. Lederer, 
Trial Advocacy: The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s—and 
Tomorrow’s—High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799 (1999); Mark D. Robins, Evidence 
at the Electronic Frontier: Introducing E-Mail at Trial in Commercial Litigation, 29 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219 (2003); Criminal Justice Magazine, Volume 19 (Spring 2004) (devoting 
entire issue to new technology evidence); Symposium: International Conference on the Legal and 
Policy Implications of Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 637–938 (2004). 
39  I am implicitly taking the position here that the use of technology to enhance the 
presentation of evidence is not inherently different in terms of potential prejudice than other types of 
evidence.  In general, that seems a sound assessment. 
Another type of concern is whether the increased use of sophisticated technology will 
exacerbate the gap between adversaries with unequal resources.  See Galves, supra note 36, at 290–
91.  Rarely is this a matter that should affect admissibility, but it is a concern for the justice system.  
However, if courts provide the technology and thus provide access for parties with limited resources, 
that gap may be reduced somewhat or even eliminated.  See Michael E. Heintz, Note, The Digital 
Divide and Courtroom Technology: Can David Keep Up with Goliath?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 567, 
586–88 (2002). 
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used easily during closing argument and whether it goes to the jury during its 
deliberations.40 
 
B. Effect of Technology on the Proof of Disputed Fact 
 
The available evidence tends to determine how disputed facts are proved in 
the courtroom.  In many ways, such proof has remained relatively unchanged for 
several hundred years.  However, there is some suggestion that through accretion 
of scientific and technological advances proof of contested facts, particularly in 
criminal cases, and courts’ and jurors’ appreciation of such evidence may be 
changing in a fundamental way.  The items that I will note may be disjunctive, but 
I believe they have some common threads that are having a major cumulative 
impact. 
My insights are both practically and theoretically driven.  Before becoming an 
academic, I had substantial experience in trial work.  I spent seven years as a 
public defender at the Washington, D.C. Public Defender Service where I tried 
criminal cases, including a number of homicides, and ultimately as Chief of the 
Trial Division, consulted throughout the office on a broad range of my colleagues’ 
cases.  The cases I saw were part of the gritty world of ordinary criminal litigation.  
Most of the evidence consisted of the perceptions and memories of ordinary 
citizens, buttressed from time to time by basic forensic evidence, such as 
fingerprints, serology, autopsies, and ballistics.  This was not the super high-tech 
world that intrudes into cases with greater frequency today.  Certainly, many 
criminal cases will continue, like the ones I saw up close, to be based largely on 
such ordinary evidence. 
 
1. Who “Done It?”: The Creation of More “Trace” Evidence and Magnifying 
Its Impact 
 
Increasingly, we see the use of technological and scientific evidence in a 
growing range of criminal cases to show who is the perpetrator.  Videotapes or 
pictures of actual events in criminal cases were almost never part of criminal cases 
two decades ago.  They are more and more a part of cases today with the ubiquity 
of various types of recording systems.  Recordings may be made by surveillance 
cameras in stores, at ATMs, and on street corners, or by pictures made by 
passersby who more frequently today have video cameras and picture phones as 
they walk and drive about.  Others leave behind evidence trails in e-mails or 
physical trails of their travels by automobile electronic pass information.41 
                                                                                                                            
40  See Brian Carney & Neal Feigenson, Visual Persuasion in the Michael Skakel Trial: 
Enhancing Advocacy through Interactive Media Presentations, 19 CRIM. JUST. 22, 28–29 (Spring 
2004) (commenting on the effective use of video during the prosecution’s closing argument and 
debating the issues of how best to allow jurors to view admitted video evidence during deliberations). 
41  I observe that some young people appear almost constantly in communication through cell 
phones and instant messaging.  That gives rise to more admissible hearsay under Rule 803(1), which 
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In general, new types of “trace” evidence, which is not physical trace 
evidence like fingerprints or DNA, but recordings of actions and motions, are 
being created that did not exist at previous times.  The chances are growing that 
crimes committed in public places will have some part of them on film and that 
versions of events given by suspects and witnesses will have elements that can be 
corroborated or refuted by electronic trace evidence.  Stories should have points of 
corroboration or contradiction that were not available earlier, and the growth of 
these unknown and unanticipated sources of evidence makes it somewhat more 
difficult for false claims to succeed.  In a number of recent national crime stories, 
the original version of events given by either a possibly guilty perpetrator42 or a 
bogus victim was rather conclusively refuted.43 
Also, the growing power of computers, the digitizing of evidence, and the 
development of sophisticated search technology have allowed for far more 
effective use of the trace evidence that is discovered.  DNA analysis is possible 
with smaller amounts of material than earlier forms of the technology required. 
“Cold hits” occur, whereby completely unknown suspects are identified by 
computer searches that match fingerprint fragments and DNA profiles.  These 
processes were at one time totally impractical because of computing limitations, 
and one must assume they will become ever more common as technological 
capacity advances. 
A different, but perhaps related, development has been the “innocence 
movement” that has grown out of the use of DNA evidence principally in death 
penalty cases but is having some impact in other types of serious criminal cases.  
This type of “proof of innocence”44 demonstrated errors in criminal convictions of 
                                                                                                                            
requires contemporaneous communication of observations.  I predict that this exception, which has 
been used relatively little in the past because most ordinary events are not communicated 
contemporaneously to others, see JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 271 (5th ed. 1999), 
will be used more frequently as a larger percentage of ordinary events are routinely narrated as part of 
an almost continuous series of conversations.  
In addition, technologies such as picture phones, rather than relying on human description and 
memory, not only generate a digital image, but also create a digital record of that observation that is 
stored in a relatively long-lasting data bank.  This type of “observation” can very easily be displayed 
as powerful recorded evidence of the event. 
42  See Possible Break in Disappearance of Student in Aruba, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at 
A10 (reporting that the story of three men suspected of kidnapping Natalee Holloway in Aruba was 
undercut when security cameras at the hotel where the suspects said they left Ms. Holloway did not 
show her return). 
43  See Lisa Donovan, Woman Admits to Hoax, DULUTH NEWS TRIBUNE, Apr. 3, 2004, at 1A 
(describing unraveling of story by victim of nationally publicized kidnapping hoax, who admitted to 
staging the event after videotape at store showed her buying a knife, duct tape, rope, and other items 
allegedly used by perpetrator, and her home computer revealed that shortly before the alleged 
abduction she had used it to find the location of wooded areas near her residence and to access the 
five-day weather forecast that covered the period of her alleged kidnapping). 
44  I do not claim that DNA evidence that does not show guilt is the same as proof of 
innocence.  There are reasons why the failure to find the defendant’s DNA may not mean that he or 
she is innocent—for example an unknown person may have left the DNA while the defendant left 
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the most serious type that cannot be discounted.  The reversal in formal assessment 
of guilt happened because trace evidence that could not be tested at the time the 
cases were tried was preserved and could be tested by later-developed DNA 
technology.  In many cases, DNA evidence confirmed the fallibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence, which was always theoretically suspect.  However, DNA 
showed with scientific certainty that such identifications can sometimes be dead 
wrong. 
The result of these cases has been to encourage calls for higher standards for 
the proof of guilt.  Some proposals include better procedures for conducting the 
showing of photos for identification procedures in criminal cases;45 videotaping 
interrogations of the suspects in serious cases; and imposing certification 
procedures on forensic labs that analyze trace evidence.  This movement dovetails 
with one of the likely lasting results of Daubert—a demand either that scientific 
and technological claims be shown to be valid or that the evidence be excluded.46 
I am not sure anything unique is happening here.  The burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt in criminal cases was always designed to make false 
convictions far more difficult to obtain than false acquittals.47  What may be 
developing, however, is a growing skepticism of convictions obtained without 
corroborating trace evidence. 
Finally, there is some anecdotal evidence at least to suggest jurors may be 
acquiring an unrealistic expectation of the certainty that scientific forensic 
evidence may provide.  I want to use here what I take as mainly a metaphor rather 
than a causative agent.  This is what some call the “CSI effect.”48 CSI, which 
stands for Crime Scene Investigation, is now an ever-expanding series of very 
popular television shows that air on CBS in which crimes are solved by use of 
sophisticated forensic tools. 
The message of the series is that dispositive forensic evidence almost always 
exists to prove the guilt of the true perpetrator and to exculpate the innocent.  It is a 
modern day version of Perry Mason’s cross-examination when the guilty party had 
no alternative but to confess under Perry’s examination.  In CSI, frequently the 
                                                                                                                            
none. 
45  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES FOR PROMOTING THE 
ACCURACY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (Aug. 2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/annual/dailyjournal/111c.doc. 
46  Cf. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503–05 (2005) (arguing that Daubert has had 
an effect not only on states that adopted that standard but on Frye states as well in causing judges to 
be more restrictive in admitting scientific evidence in civil cases). 
47  William Blackstone made the well-known statement, “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons 
escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
ENGLAND 358. 
48  See Boatswain v. State, No. 408-2004, 2005 WL 1000565 (Del. Apr. 27, 2005) (concluding 
that the prosecutor’s closing argument that, unlike on CSI, finding no fingerprints did not mean the 
defendant was not guilty, improperly diminished the state’s burden). 
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same result occurs after the test comes back and conclusively identifies the 
perpetrator. 
As yet, only the intuition of trial lawyers49 and judges50 suggests the impact of 
this phenomenon on the expectations of jurors.  In cases I tried, fingerprints were 
only rarely found because, at least with the recovery technology of that era, 
useable fingerprints were often not left on surfaces that could be effectively 
processed.  The growing use of more sophisticated techniques and the over-
statement of their effectiveness in shows such as CSI, however, may produce a 
different reaction in jurors today.  In my day, jurors seemed quite willing to accept 
that fingerprints were hard to find.  Whether that is the mindset today, I am not so 
sure.  Moreover, as more and more trace evidence is developed and analyzed more 
effectively, the expectation may grow that such proof must exist if guilt is to be 
found.51 
 
2. With What Intent?: Not Such Clear Progress, but Major Possibilities for 
the Detection of Lies 
 
The advances in scientific evidence that I have been discussing largely have 
affected the process of identifying the perpetrator.52  Fewer developments have 
enhanced our ability to determine the intent with which action was taken, often the 
key issue in determining whether a crime occurred (e.g., rape, when sexual 
intercourse clearly occurred and the parties know each other, or whether a killing 
was committed in self-defense) or in setting the level of the offense (the grading of 
homicides between first-degree and second-degree murder and manslaughter).  
There are, however, indications that new technology may have an enormous 
impact here as well.  New technology promises major advances in lie detection, 
which with its potential to solve these problems of intent may unsettle much of our 
current understanding of fact-finding through trials. 
                                                                                                                            
49  See Michael Watkins, Forensics in the Media (2005) (unpublished study, on file with the 
author) (describing empirical research indicating that lawyers believe CSI has altered juror 
perceptions and describing the resulting changes in lawyer behavior). 
50  When I presented this paper to the Ohio Judicial Conference in September 2005 to several 
hundred judges the point I made that received the most reaction was the CSI effect.  The judges 
reported in comments both at the public session and privately that they frequently see indications of 
this effect in the questions and comments of jurors and that they and the lawyers trying cases spend 
time acting upon the perception that the effect on jurors is real and important. 
51  Perhaps we saw something of this phenomenon in the acquittal of Richard Scrushy.  See 
Simon Romero & Kyle Whitmire, Former Chief of HealthSouth Acquitted in $2.7 Billion Fraud, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A1 (reporting that one juror said, “I wanted more than just hearsay,” 
and another said, “I wanted something in black and white, something like fingerprints”).  It is 
somewhat remarkable that a juror wanted and perhaps expected actual fingerprint evidence in a 
Sarbanes-Oxley accounting fraud prosecution. 
52  Trace evidence left in e-mails or on computer hard drives can show the intention of their 
author as well as revealing the perpetrator’s identity. 
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The promising technology that I am focusing on is functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI).53  In addition to MRI technology that is somewhat 
familiar to many of us, this technology also relies on “blood oxygenation level 
dependent” (BOLD) contrast, which allows it to detect increases in brain activity.  
In essence, it allows us to see what parts of the brain are being used in a task by the 
test subject.  The basic theory, which is being developed and validated by a 
number of researchers,54 is that different parts of the brain are involved in 
deception than when a person simply recalls information.55 
Conceptually, this new technology promises to advance lie detection greatly 
beyond the effectiveness of today’s polygraph.  In contrast to functional MRI 
technology, the polygraph detects the subject’s physiological reactions to 
questioning, registering non-specific changes in arousal, and not the act of 
deception itself.  As a result, some subjects may be able to take countermeasures to 
suppress the emotional response to lying.  Functional MRI in essence observes the 
mental activity involved in telling a lie.  
Although the various uses of functional MRI are not yet clearly established, 
the technology may permit testing beyond subjects who voluntarily submit to a 
polygraph and answer a series of test questions.  Such testing could allow a 
determination, by brain activity indicating familiarity, that the subject has guilty 
knowledge of some object he or she is shown.56 
I do not know that we will ever achieve a technology that reliably determines 
deception.  Functional MRI may in the end prove no better than earlier lie 
detection technologies, but it has a potential to move the process of determining 
deception forward even if it does not itself reach proficiency.  What would be the 
consequences of developing such technology? That is indeed a difficult question. 
I suggest no evidentiary and constitutional revolution.  Certainly the Fifth 
Amendment would stand in the way of requiring a criminal suspect to take a lie 
                                                                                                                            
53  See generally Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric 
Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1601, 1607–08 (2005).  See also 
Michael S. Beauchamp, Functional MRI for Beginners, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 397, 397–98 
(2002). 
54  See, e.g., Frank Andrew Kozel et al., A Replication Study of Neural Correlates of 
Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852, 853−54 (2004); F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot 
Study of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young 
Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 295, 296 (2004) [hereinafter Kozel et al., A 
Pilot Study]; D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 727 (2002); Jennifer Maria Nunez et 
al., Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive 
Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267, 273−76 (2005); Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional 
Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849 (2001). 
55  See Kozel et al., A Pilot Study, supra note 54, at 296; Langleben et al., supra note 54, at 
727; Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM. 
BRAIN MAPPING 157, 158 (2002).  
56  See Faye Flam, Your Brain May Soon be Used Against You, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 
29, 2002, at A1. 
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detector test or an argument or comment by the prosecutor about the suspect’s 
failure to do so.57  The Fourth Amendment would likely restrict58 and Fifth 
Amendment would likely prevent59 involuntary uses of functional MRIs to show 
deception in criminal cases.  And while some jurisdictions allow polygraph results 
to be admitted by the defendant in selected circumstances, that is the minority 
view.60  A more effective lie detection technology would have no direct impact on 
this body of law that generally restricts its admissibility. 
I do imagine, however, if there were a truly accurate lie detection technology, 
over time it would have a substantial impact both on how criminal cases are 
handled before trial and on how they are tried.  Wouldn’t innocent defendants 
submit to lie detectors and prosecutors dismiss cases when the results are favorable 
to the defendant? Wouldn’t the Due Process Clause mandate admissibility for 
clearly authoritative lie detector results favorable to the defendant?61 Wouldn’t 
potential jurors learn of this general process and suspect that those not taking 
advantage of it are guilty?  I assume the impact in civil cases would be even 
greater where juror knowledge of the results or the refusal to undergo the 
examination would be more direct. 
 
C. The Impact of Terrorism 
 
No doubt our effort to prevent and punish terrorism will play a substantial role 
in technological advances in detecting and solving crime.  The bombings in 
London during the summer of 2005 showed the use of England’s system of 
surveillance cameras, the usefulness of picture phones, and the application of 
advanced forensic techniques.  Presumably, lessons learned regarding what proved 
helpful in that investigation will be used to develop and deploy technology to meet 
the continued threat of terrorism. 
                                                                                                                            
57  The Fifth Amendment would not impose the same restrictions on, for example, informing 
the jury of a civil litigant’s refusal to submit to testing. 
58  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (requiring a warrant for use of 
technology that obtains information about activities inside the home, which should impose a similar 
requirement on technology that gathers information from inside the mind). 
59  Cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 598–600 (1990) (ruling that interrogation about 
date of defendant’s sixth birthday revealed mental processes covered by the Fifth Amendment). 
60  See Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1998) 
(describing mixed results in the courts on the admissibility of polygraph evidence offered by the 
defense in criminal cases).  In United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 317 (1998), the Supreme Court 
upheld a per se rule of exclusion of polygraph evidence even when offered by the defense.  However, 
Justice Kennedy, writing for four justices, stated that in a more compelling case the result might be 
different.  Id. at 318.  He did not make any direct reference to a far more accurate lie detector 
technology, but one would imagine that such technology would further support arguments by the 
defense for a constitutional right to introduce such evidence. 
61  See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302–03 (1973) (requiring admission of 
exculpatory confession). 
      OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW               [Vol 3:523 
 
 
540 
Efforts to make our own country safer from terrorist attacks will surely be 
separated from the efforts to prevent and solve ordinary crime.  However, 
techniques used in the anti-terrorism effort, such as expanded video monitoring of 
public places and the cumulation and analysis of that data will likely seep into 
ordinary cases and spawn the development of new identification technologies that 
over time gain widespread use in ordinary criminal investigations.  
 
D. The Overall Impact of Technological Change  
 
How these technological trends will affect evidence rules is unclear to me and 
my fuzzy crystal ball.  My suspicion is that technical rules of admissibility, such as 
those dealing with authentication, which currently are quite easily met, will remain 
that way.  The impact thus may not be so much on admissibility, but rather on 
what is in fact offered and what is found to be sufficient.  
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that technology will eliminate 
uncertainty.  That will never happen where we are trying to reconstruct the actions 
and thoughts of human beings.  Moreover, crime is often committed in secret.  
Technology may, however, reduce the number and types of cases where real 
uncertainty exists, and we may find that more cases are relatively conclusively 
proved.  At the same time, we may observe a greater difficulty in securing 
convictions in cases that depend on the perceptions and memories of witnesses and 
lack corroborating “hard evidence.” 
The effects of technological advances push in two conflicting directions when 
it comes to findings of guilt or innocence.  On the one hand, as more types of 
powerful evidence become available, many cases will become much stronger, 
sometimes virtually irrefutable, and will lead to more convictions.  These clearly 
proved cases may reinforce a growing sense in the public to expect and sometimes 
to require such types of proof, which cannot be met in many other cases where 
definite scientific proof is absent.  
Will the availability of certain proof in clear cases interfere with the necessary 
task in many more trials for the jurors to evaluate uncertain evidence and to make 
the best human judgment possible? Will it effectively change what is meant by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt?  If so, courts may need at least to develop new 
instructions to set a context for jury determinations in different types of cases. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The history of evidence law in the last century was eventful although not 
filled with dramatic changes, and I predict at least the near-term future will be 
much the same.  After unsuccessful efforts at law reform, the rules as adopted had 
the more modest goals of uniformity and consolidation of progressive common law 
trends.  Their achievements in modifying the law and practice, although largely 
technical, were cumulatively quite significant. 
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The future of changes in evidence law per se could be even more modest.  
One exception may occur in the area of hearsay reformulation.  This will be 
possible if the Supreme Court in a future decision turns the separation between the 
protections against unreliable or untrustworthy evidence provided by the hearsay 
rules and that afforded by the Confrontation Clause, which Crawford announced, 
into a total break.62  I anticipate that Crawford will at least encourage more 
piecemeal hearsay innovation if not a wholesale reformulation. 
Proof of facts and their evaluation by juries could be enormously changed by 
technological advances that are upon us.  These changes are most pronounced in 
the expansion of dispositive trace evidence, particularly pictorial trace evidence.  
Extremely significant advances may occur in the near future on proof of deception, 
which could prove even more revolutionary.  Together they may change juror 
expectations about the quality of proof that is available, whether or not accurate in 
a particular case, and may affect when jurors are willing to convict and condemn. 
My suggestions for the shape of the future depends upon my ability to foresee 
that future, and for most people, including me, such “crystal ball” gazing is highly 
problematic.  Nevertheless, I do sense that changes that are different in kind are 
beginning to affect proof and evaluation of proof, particularly in criminal cases, as 
the result of the accumulation of scientific and technological changes.  On that 
general point, although not the specifics, I am reasonably confident.  Among our 
tasks in addition to anticipating the future will be the very real need to respond to 
those changes as they occur.  I believe it will be a very interesting evidence future 
indeed. 
                                                                                                                            
62  This total break is marginally more likely in that the justices who cast the two votes taking 
issue with the new system and supporting continuation of Roberts, Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O’Connor, are no longer on the Court. 
